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ABSTRACT
The problem of Kalman filtering under a differential privacy
constraint is considered in this paper. This problem arises in
scenarios where an aggregate statistic must be published in
real-time based on privacy-sensitive input signals, which can
be assumed to originate from a linear Gaussian model. We
propose an architecture combining the differentially private
Gaussian mechanism with a linear pre-filter for signal shap-
ing and a Kalman filter for output reconstruction. When the
signal shaping block is static, it is shown that the optimum dif-
ferentially private mechanism following this architecture can
be computed using semidefinite programming. Performance
improvements over the simpler input perturbation mechanism
are illustrated analytically and through computer simulations.
Index Terms— Privacy, Kalman Filtering, Estimation,
Filtering, Linear Matrix Inequalities
1. INTRODUCTION
Advances in real-time communication technologies play a
major role in the evolution of modern infrastructures, e.g.,
smart grids or intelligent transportation systems, allowing
networks of sensors to perform estimation and fault detection
more accurately in these complex systems. However, the raw
input signals often consist of privacy-sensitive data collected
from individuals, such as location or power consumption
traces. In the case of smart metering for example, it has been
shown that fine-grained measurements of the electricity con-
sumption of a house allows the inference of many personal
details such as when and for how long individual appliances
are used [1, 2]. Thus, it becomes essential to develop privacy
preserving mechanisms protecting individual users.
Many recent privacy-preserving data analysis approaches
rely on the notion of differential privacy [3, 4]. In scenarios
where a data holder releases the result of a computation based
on private data obtained from individuals, differential privacy
guarantees to these individuals that providing their data can-
not significantly improve the capability of an adversary to
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and by FRQNT under Grant 2015-NC-181370 and an FRQNT international
internship scholarship.
make inferences about them, and in exchange they might de-
rive important benefits from the system. The design of privacy
preserving mechanisms for data analysis in static databases
has been widely studied in previous work [5, 4, 6, 7]. Much
less attention has been devoted to dynamic datasets however
[8, 9], and in particular to the design of privacy-preserving
model-based dynamic estimators [10, 11, 12, 13].
Many applications such as health monitoring [14] or fault
detection [15] require model-based estimators dealing with
dynamic, time-varying data streams [16, 17]. The main con-
tribution of this paper is to design a new differentially pri-
vate Kalman filter for dynamic data modelled as the output
of a linear Gaussian system, revisiting our previous work in
[18, 11]. In these papers, a differentially private filter was
designed by adding privacy-preserving noise either directly
on the measured signals (input perturbation), or on the re-
leased signal (output perturbation). Moreover, a two-stage
approximation architecture for differentially private filtering,
generalizing both the input and output perturbation mecha-
nisms, is proposed in [19, 11], but has not yet been applied
to differentially private Kalman filtering, which is the goal of
this paper. We also consider the design of time-varying fil-
ters, whereas our previous work only considered the steady-
state case. Similar two-stage architectures are considered for
example in [6] for batch processing systems, in [20] for an
information-theoretic constraint replacing differential privacy
in a related Kalman filter design problem, and are in fact rem-
iniscent of joint transmitter-receiver design problems in the
communication literature [21, 22].
Section 2 of this paper provides some background on dif-
ferential privacy and presents the problem statement. In Sec-
tion 3, we illustrate in a scalar example that a two-stage ar-
chitecture can provide significant improvement over the input
perturbation mechanism. Section 4 describes this architec-
ture more generally, which uses a linear transformation of the
inputs signals followed by the standard Gaussian mechanism
for differential privacy and finally a Kalman filter. It is shown
that the problem of optimizing the input linear transformation
can be cast as a Semidefinite Program (SDP). Subsection 4.4
describes an application to syndromic surveillance systems.
Notation: Throughout this paper, we fix a generic prob-
ability triple (Ω,F ,P), where F is a σ-algebra on Ω and P a
probability measure defined on F . We denote the `p-norm of
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a vector x ∈ Rk by |x|p := (
∑k
i=1 |xi|p)1/p, for p ∈ [1,∞].
For a matrix A, the induced 2-norm is denoted ‖A‖2 and the
Frobenius norm ‖A‖F :=
√
Tr(ATA). Finally, for a signal x
we denote xt := {x0, . . . , xt}.
2. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Consider a set of n measured and privacy-sensitive signals
{yi,t}0≤t≤T , i = 1, . . . , n, with yi,t ∈ Rpi , which could orig-
inate from n distinct individuals for example. We assume that
a model explaining this data is publicly known, and consists
of a linear system with n individual vector-valued indepen-
dent states corresponding to the n measured signals
xi,t+1 = Ai,txi,t + wi,t, t = 0, 1, ..., T − 1, (1)
yi,t = Ci,txi,t + vi,t, t = 0, 1, ..., T,
for i = 1, . . . , n, where xi,t, wi,t ∈ Rmi , with wi,t ∼
N (0,Wi,t) and vi,t ∼ N (0, Vi) independent sequences of
iid zero-mean Gaussian random vectors with covariance ma-
trices Wi,t, Vi  0, for i = 1, . . . , n. The initial conditions
xi,0 are Gaussian random vectors independent of the noise
processes wt and vt, with mean xi,0 and covariance matrices
Σ−i,0, assumed invertible.
A data aggregator aims at releasing a causal minimum
mean square estimator zˆt of a linear combination zt =∑n
i=1 Li,txi,t of the individual states, computed from the
signals yi, where Li,t are given matrices. The data xi,0, Σ−i,0,
Ai,t, Ci,t,Wi,t, Vi, Li,t are assumed to be public information.
In the absence of privacy constraint, the optimal estimator is
zˆt =
∑n
i=1 Li,txˆi,t, with xˆi,t provided by the time-varying
Kalman filter estimating the state of system i from the signal
yi [23]. However, this paper considers the situation where
the publicly released estimate zˆ should also guarantee the
differential privacy of the input signals yi. In the rest of
this section, we review the notion of differential privacy and
present one mechanism used to achieve it [3].
Basic Differentially Private Mechanism. Let H be a
space of datasets of interest, in our case, the space of global
measurement signals y with yt =
[
yT1,t, . . . , y
T
n,t
]T
. A mecha-
nism M is a random map from H to some measurable output
space O. We introduce for a given application a symmetric
binary relation Adj on H, called adjacency [24]. For our sce-
nario, we define an adjacency relation by
Adj(y, y′) iff for some i, ‖yi − y′i‖2 ≤ ρi, (2)
and yj = y′j for all j 6= i,
with {ρl}nl=1 ∈ Rn+ a given set of positive numbers, and
‖v‖2 :=
(∑T
t=0 |vt|22
)1/2
, where | · |2 denotes the Euclidean
(vector) norm. Hence, two adjacent global measurement sig-
nals differ by the values of a single participant, with only
bounded signal deviations allowed for each individual. Dif-
ferentially private mechanisms produce randomized outputs
with distributions that are close for adjacent inputs [3].
Definition 1. Let H be a space equipped with a symmetric
binary relation denoted Adj, and let (O,M) be a measurable
space, whereM is a given σ-algebra over O. Let , δ ≥ 0. A
randomized mechanismM fromH toO is (, δ)-differentially
private (for Adj) if for all h, h′ ∈ H such that Adj(h, h′),
P(M(h) ∈ S) ≤ e P(M(h′) ∈ S) + δ, ∀S ∈M. (3)
Definition 2. Let H be equipped with an adjacency relation
Adj. LetO be a vector space with norm ‖ · ‖O. The sensitivity
of a query q : H 7→ O is4Oq := sup{h,h′:Adj(h,h′)} ‖q(h)−
q(h′)‖O. In particular, for O = Rk (with k possibly equal to
+∞) equipped with the p-norm for p ∈ [1,∞], this defines
the `p-sensitivity, denoted4pq.
The Gaussian mechanism [5] consists in adding Gaussian
noise proportional to the `2-sensitivity to provide (, δ)-
differential privacy. We follow here the presentation in
[11] and consider queries that are dynamical systems with
vector-valued input and output signals. Let us define the
Q-function Q(x) := 1√
2pi
∫∞
x
exp(−u22 )du and κδ, =
1
2 (µ+
√
µ2 + 2), with µ = Q−1(δ).
Theorem 1. Let G be a system with p inputs and q outputs.
Then the mechanismM(y) = Gy+ν, where νt is sequence of
iid Gaussian vectors with covariance matrix κ2δ,(∆2G)
2Iq , is
(, δ)-differentially private.
By resilience to post-processing [24], the differentially
private signal produced by Theorem 1 can then be processed
by a Kalman filter taking into account the privacy-preserving
noise ν to produce zˆ. When G = I , this leads to the input
perturbation mechanism discussed in [18]. In the rest of this
paper, we study more general transformations for G.
3. A SCALAR EXAMPLE
The purpose of this section is to illustrate via a simple exam-
ple with scalar signals that one can improve the performance
of the input mechanism significantly by properly combining
the input signals before adding the privacy preserving noise.
Consider the scalar case of model (1) withAi,t = a, Ci,t = c,
Wi,t = σ
2
w, Vi = σ
2
v and Li,t = 1 (so zt =
∑n
i=1 xi,t),
and assume ρi := ρ for all i in (2). We also let T → ∞
and consider the steady-state mean squared error (MSE)
limT→∞ 1T+1
∑T
t=0 E
[‖zt − zˆt‖22] as performance measure
of a given estimate zˆ of z.
The input perturbation architecture proposed in [18] is
shown on Fig.1.a and is equivalent to the global system
xt+1 = Atxt + wt, (4)
yt = Ctxt + vt,
with At = aIn, wt =
[
w1,t . . . wn,t
]T
, Ct = cIn
and vt =
[
v1,t . . . vn,t
]T
. Let γ = κδ, ρ. Since
xˆ1,t = E[x1,t|st1]
Kalman filter
Kalman filter
xˆn,t = E[xn,t|stn]
+
+
xˆ1,t
xˆn,t
y1,t
yn,t sn,t
⇣n,t
⇣1,t
s1,t
(a) Input perturbation
Kalman filter
y1,t
yn,t
⇣t
D +
st zˆt
zˆt = E[zt|st]
(b) Improved architecture
Fig. 1: Differential private Kalman filtering architectures.
supy,y′:Adj(y,y′) ‖y − y′‖2 = ρ, by Theorem 1, releasing
st = yt + ζt, with ζt ∼ N (0, γ2In), is (, δ)-differentially
private for the adjacency relation (2). Solving a steady-state
Kalman filter algebraic Riccati equation (ARE) for (4) with
measurements st leads to the following MSE expression for
zˆ
MSE1 =
n
2c2
(
−β +
√
β2 + 4(γ2 + σ2v)σ
2
wc
2
)
, (5)
where β = (1− a2)(σ2v + γ2)− c2σ2w.
Instead of using input perturbation, we can use the archi-
tecture shown on Fig.1.b with D = 1Tn, a 1 × n row vector
of ones. Consider the same adjacency relation (2) and denote
ht = Dyt =
∑n
i=1 yi,t, θt =
∑n
i=1 wi,t and λt =
∑n
i=1 vi,t.
We have
zt+1 = azt + θt,
ht = czt + λt.
Since again supy,y′:Adj(y,y′) ‖Dy −Dy′‖2 = ρ, releasing
st = ht + ζt, with ζt ∼ N (0, γ2), is (, δ)-differentially
private for the adjacency relation (2). Solving the ARE for
the corresponding Kalman filter leads to the following MSE
expression for zˆ
MSE2 =
n
2c2
(
−β(n) +
√
β2(n) + 4
(
γ2
n
+ σ2v
)
σ2wc
2
)
,
(6)
where β(n) = (1− a2)
(
σ2v +
γ2
n
)
− c2σ2w.
Comparing (5) and (6), we see that the only difference
is the vanishing influence of the privacy preserving noise on
MSE2 as n increases, through the term γ2/n replacing γ2
in MSE1. For example, if n = 100, a = 1, c = 1, ρ =
50,  = ln(3), δ = 0.05, σ2w = 0.5, σ
2
v = 0.9, we obtain
MSE1 ≈ 6235 and MSE2 ≈ 650.
4. DESIGN OF THE TWO-STAGE MECHANISM
We are now interested in designing the matrix D in Fig.1.b
for the more general situation presented in Section 2. Con-
sider the n individual dynamics (1). They form a global
system whose dynamics can be expressed as (4), with At
and Ct block-diagonal matrices having respectively Ai,t and
Ci,t on their diagonal, wt =
[
wT1,t . . . w
T
n,t
]T
and vt =[
vT1,t . . . v
T
n,t
]T
. Denote by Wt = diag(W1,t, . . . ,Wn,t)
and V = diag(V1, . . . , Vn) the covariance matrices of respec-
tively wt and vt. Following Fig.1.b., we construct a differen-
tially private estimate zˆt of zt by first multiplying the global
signal y with a constant matrix D =
[
D1 D2 . . . Dn
]
,
with Di ∈ Rq×pi to be designed and q to be determined.
Then, we add white Gaussian noise ζt according to the Gaus-
sian mechanism, in order to make the signal st differentially
private, with
st = Dyt + ζt = DCtxt +Dvt + ζt. (7)
Finally, we construct a causal minimum mean square error
estimator xˆt of xt from st, a task for which it is optimal to use
a Kalman filter, since the system producing st is still linear
and Gaussian. We then let zˆt =
∑n
i=1 Li,txˆi,t := Ltxˆt. For
measurement signals y and y′ adjacent according to (2) and
differing in user i, we have
‖Dy −Dy′‖2 = ‖Diyi −Diy′i‖2 ≤ ρi‖Di‖2,
where ‖Di‖2 denotes the maximum singular value of the
matrix Di, and there are signals yi, y′i achieving the bound.
Hence, we can bound the sensibility of D as follows
42D := sup
y,y′:Adj(y,y′)
‖Dy −Dy′‖2
= max
1≤i≤n
{ρi‖Di‖2}. (8)
From Theorem 1, releasing st = Dyt + ζt, with ζt ∼
N (0, (κδ,42D)2Iq), is (, δ)-differentially private for the
adjacency relation (2).
4.1. Input Transformation Optimization
Let Σ¯t and Σt be the covariance matrices of xt − xˆt after
the time update step and the measurement update step respec-
tively in the Kalman filter. We have
Σ¯t = At−1Σt−1ATt−1 +Wt−1, (9a)
Σ−1t = Σ¯
−1
t + C
T
t ΠCt, (9b)
Π , DT(DVDT + (κδ,42D)2Iq)−1D. (9c)
Recall that we are given the initial covariance matrix Σ¯0 =
diag(Σ−1,0, . . .Σ
−
n,0) for the state x0. With the matrix D left
to design, the estimator zˆ = Ltxˆt of zt = Ltx with minimum
MSE, defined as 1T+1
∑T
t=0 E
[‖zt − zˆt‖22], is obtained by
finding D∗ and the covariance matrices Σ∗t solving the fol-
lowing optimization problem
min
Σt0,D
1
T + 1
T∑
t=0
Tr(LtΣtLTt ) (10a)
s.t. Σ−10 = Σ¯
−1
0 + C
T
0 ΠC0 (10b)
Σ−1t+1 = (AtΣtA
T
t +Wt)
−1
+ CTt+1ΠCt+1, 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 1,
(10c)
Π = DT(DVDT + κ2δ,(∆2D)
2Iq)
−1D. (10d)
Indeed, the Kalman filter gains necessary to construct zˆt can
be computed from the optimal covariance matrices. With
V  0, we can deduce an equivalent form of (10d) by us-
ing the matrix inversion lemma again
Π = V −1 − V −1
(
V −1 +
DTD
(κδ,∆2D)2
)−1
V −1, (11)
from which we obtain
κ2δ,
[
(V − VΠV )−1 − V −1
]
=
DTD
∆2D2
. (12)
4.2. Semidefinite Programming-based Synthesis
Here we show that the optimization problem (10a)-(10d) can
be recast as an SDP and hence solved efficiently [25], if we
impose the following additional constraint on D
∆2D = ρ1‖D1‖2 = . . . = ρn‖Dn‖2. (13)
The following Lemma shows that no loss of performance oc-
curs by adding the constraint (13) to (10a)-(10d), i.e., that this
constraint is satisfied automatically by a matrix D∗ that is op-
timal for (10a)-(10d).
Lemma 1. For any feasible solution {D,Σt}t of (10a)-(10d)
that does not satisfy (13), there exists a feasible solution that
does satisfy this constraint and gives a lower or equal cost.
In particular, there exists an optimum solution to (10a)-(10d)
such that the D matrix satisfies ∆2D := maxj{ρj‖Dj‖2} =
ρi‖Di‖2 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Proof. Consider a feasible solution {D,Σt}t for (10a)-
(10d). If (13) is not satisfied by D, construct the matrix
M = DTD+diag
(
{ηiIpi}1≤i≤n
)
, with ηi = (∆2D/ρi)2−
‖Di‖22. Then the diagonal block i of M is Mii = DTi Di +
[(∆2D/ρi)
2 − ‖Di‖22]Ipi , which has maximum eigenvalue
(∆2D/ρi)
2. Define some matrix D˜ such that D˜TD = M and
group the columns of D˜ as D˜ =
[
D˜1 . . . D˜n
]
following the
notation for the columns of D. In particular Mii = D˜Ti D˜i,
so D˜Ti D˜i has maximum eigenvalue (∆2D/ρi)
2 and hence
D˜i has maximum singular value (∆2D/ρi). In other words,
D˜ satisfies (13) with a sensibility ∆2D = ∆2D˜ that is un-
changed, and moreover D˜T D˜ = M  DTD.
Hence ∆2D in the denominator of (11) remains un-
changed, and moreover(
V −1 +
D˜TD˜
(κδ,∆2D˜)2
)−1

(
V −1 +
DTD
(κδ,∆2D)2
)−1
Π˜  Π,
where Π˜ and Π are defined according to (11) for D˜ and D
respectively. Let K := Π˜−Π  0.
Replacing Π by Π˜ in (10b), we obtain a matrix Σ˜0 satis-
fying Σ˜−10 = Σ
−1
0 + C
T
0 KC0  Σ−10 , so Σ˜0  Σ0. Now
if we have two matrices Σ˜t  Σt, and Σ˜t+1,Σt+1 defined
according to (10c) together with Π˜ and Π, then immediately
Σ˜−1t+1 = (AtΣ˜tA
T
t +Wt)
−1 + CTt+1Π˜Ct+1
 (AtΣtATt +Wt)−1 + CTt+1Π˜Ct+1
= Σ−1t + C
T
t+1KCt+1.
In particular Σ˜t+1  Σt+1. Hence, by recursion, we con-
struct a feasible solution {D˜, Σ˜t}t such that Σ˜t  Σt for all
t ≥ 0. This gives a smaller or equal cost
1
T + 1
T+1∑
t=0
Tr(LtΣ˜tLTt ) ≤
1
T + 1
T+1∑
t=0
Tr(LtΣtLTt ),
and so the lemma is proved.
By Lemma 1, we can add without loss of optimality the
constraint (13) to (10a)-(10d), which allows us in the fol-
lowing to recast the problem as an SDP. Let p :=
∑n
i=1 pi,
and let αi = κδ,ρi, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Denote Ei =[
0 . . . Ipi . . . 0
]T
the p × pi matrix whose elements
are zero except for an identity matrix in its ith block. The fol-
lowing lemma converts constraints (12)-(13) to a form that is
appropriate for an SDP.
Lemma 2. If Π, D satisfy the constraints (12)-(13), then Π
satisfies V − VΠV  0 together with the following con-
straints, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n,[
Ipi/α
2
i + V
−1
i E
T
i
Ei V − VΠV
]
 0,
and not
[
Ipi/α
2
i + V
−1
i E
T
i
Ei V − VΠV
]
 0.
Conversely, if Π satisfies these constraints, then there exists a
matrixD such that Π, D satisfy (12)-(13). One suchD can be
obtained by the factorization of κ2δ,
[
(V − VΠV )−1 − V −1
]
=
DTD (e.g., via singular value decomposition), and will then
satisfy ∆2D = 1.
Proof. V − VΠV  0 is immediate from (11), since it is
equal to
(
V −1 + D
TD
(κδ,∆2D)2
)−1
.
Next, we see from (12) that rescaling D to λD for any
λ 6= 0 does not impact the constraint. Hence, we can restrict
without loss of generality our design to ∆2D = 1. Together
with (13), the right-hand side of (12) then represents any posi-
tive semidefinite matrix M = DTD satisfying the constraints
that its diagonal blocks Mii = DTi Di have maximum eigen-
value equal to 1/ρ2i , since ‖Di‖2 = 1/ρi by (13). These
constraints are equivalent to saying that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
ETi
[
(V − VΠV )−1 − V −1
]
Ei  Ipi/α2i , (14)
and not ETi
[
(V − VΠV )−1 − V −1
]
Ei ≺ Ipi/α2i . (15)
Indeed, this comes from the standard fact that the maximum
value λi,max of Mii is the smallest λ satisfying Mii  λIpi .
The constraints given in the Lemma are obtained by taking
Schur complements in (14) and (15).
Note that the fact that the left-hand side of (12) is positive
semidefinite is a simple consequence of V  V − VΠV ,
hence adding the constraint (V − VΠV )−1 − V −1  0 is
unnecessary.
Next, define the information matrices Ωt = Σ−1t . If the
matricesWt are invertible, denoting Ξt = W−1t and using the
matrix inversion lemma in (10c), one gets
CTt+1ΠCt+1 − Ωt+1 + Ξt − ΞtAt(Ωt
+ATtΞtAt)
−1ATtΞt = 0. (16)
Replacing the equality in (16) by  0 and taking a Schur
complement, together with the inequalities of Lemma 2, leads
to the following SDP with variables Π  0, {Xt  0,Ωt 
0}Tt=0
min
Xt,Ωt,Π
1
T + 1
T∑
t=0
Tr(Xt) s.t. (17a)[
Xt Lt
LTt Ωt
]
 0, 0 ≤ t ≤ T, (17b)
Ω0 = Σ¯
−1
0 + C
T
0 ΠC0, (17c)[
CTt+1ΠCt+1 − Ωt+1 + Ξt ΞtAt
ATtΞt Ωt +A
T
tΞtAt
]
 0,
0 ≤ t ≤ T − 1, (17d)[
Ipi/α
2
i + V
−1
i E
T
i
Ei V − VΠV
]
 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. (17e)
Here the minimization of the cost (10a) has been replaced by
the minimization of (17a), after introducing the slack vari-
able Xt satisfying (17b), or equivalently Xt  LtΩ−1t LTt
by a taking Schur complement. We also used the fact that
ETi V
−1Ei = V −1i in (17e). Once an optimal solution for this
SDP is obtained, we recover an optimal matrix D from Π by
a singular value decomposition as explained in Lemma 2.
Theorem 2. Let Π∗  0,{X∗t  0,Ω∗t  0}0≤t≤T be an
optimal solution for (17a)-(17e). Suppose that for some 0 ≤
t ≤ T , we have Lt(Ω∗t )−1CTt 6= 0. Then there exists a matrix
D∗ such that ‖D∗i ‖2 = 1/ρi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, satisfying (12)
for Π∗, and hence (10d). Moreover, one can construct matri-
ces Σ∗t from the sequence Ω
∗
t , which together with D
∗ consti-
tute an optimal solution for (10a)-(10d) under the additional
constraint (13). Finally, the optimal costs of (10a)-(10d) and
(17a)-(17e) are equal, i.e., the SDP relaxation is tight.
Remark 1. The condition Lt(Ω∗t )−1CTt 6= 0 for some t ap-
pears to be a weak requirement to guarantee the possibility
of reconstructing the matrix D, but in future work we would
like to provide a more explicit condition directly in terms of
the problem parameters.
Remark 2. The proof shows explicitly in (18) below how to
construct the sequence Σ∗t . The procedure can be shown to
reduce to Σ∗t = (Ω
∗
t )
−1 under certain conditions, such as
Lt invertible for all t. Note however that in practice, we are
mostly interested in D∗, from which the design of the Kalman
filter and the computation of its estimation performance can
also be recovered by other standard methods, e.g., based on
the Riccati difference equations (10b)-(10c).
Proof. Consider Π∗, {X∗t ,Ω∗t }Tt=0 an optimal solution of the
SDP (17a)-(17e). One can remark that inequality (17e) is
equivalent to
α2iE
T
i
[
(V − VΠ∗V )−1 − V −1
]
Ei  Ipi
by taking a Schur complement. We show that we cannot have
α2iE
T
i
[
(V − VΠ∗V )−1 − V −1
]
Ei ≺ Ipi . Indeed, other-
wise there exists η > 0 such that the matrix Π˜ = Π∗ + ηIp
still satisfies (17e). Using this matrix Π˜ in (17c), we obtain
a matrix Ω˜0 = Ω∗0 + ηC
T
0 C0 feasible for (17c). Now define
Ω˜1 = Ω
∗
1 + ηC
T
1 C1. One can immediately check that Π˜, Ω˜0
and Ω˜1 satisfy (17d) for t = 0, using the fact that Ω∗0,Ω
∗
1,Π
∗
are feasible and that CT0 C0  0. Similarly one checks that
the matrices Ω˜t = Ω∗t + ηC
T
t Ct are feasible in (17d) for all
0 ≤ t ≤ T . Now in (17b), taking a Schur complement, we
obtain that the matrices X˜t = LtΩ˜−1t L
T
t are feasible. By the
matrix inversion lemma we can write
X˜t = X
∗
t − Lt(Ω∗t )−1CTtKtCt(Ω∗t )−1LTt .
for some matrices Kt  0. These matrices X˜t give a cost
1
T+1
∑T
t=0 Tr(X
∗
t )−‖Lt(Ω∗t )−1CTtK1/2t ‖F , which is a strict
improvement over the assumed optimal solution as soon as
one matrix Lt(Ω∗t )
−1CTt is not zero (since theKt’s are invert-
ible). Hence, we have a contradiction and so we cannot have
α2iE
T
i
[
(V − VΠ∗V )−1 − V −1
]
Ei ≺ Ipi . The first part of
the theorem then follows from Lemma 2, which also shows
that Π∗ satisfies (10d).
Note that the optimum value V∗ of (17a)-(17e) is at most
that of (10a)-(10d), since the constraints have been relaxed.
We now show how to construct a sequence Σ∗t , which together
with Π∗ satisfy the constraints of (10a)-(10d) and achieve the
same cost V ∗, thereby proving the remaining claims of the
theorem. Note that since Ω∗t +A
T
tΞtAt  0, (17d) is equiva-
lent toRt(Ω∗t ,Ω∗t+1)  0, where
Rt(Ω1,Ω2) :=CTt+1Π∗Ct+1 − Ω2 + Ξt
− ΞtAt(Ω1 +ATtΞtAt)−1ATtΞt.
First, we take Σ∗0 = (Ω
∗
0)
−1. If Rt(Ω∗t ,Ω∗t+1) = 0
for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 1, then the matrices Ω∗t satisfy (16)
and we can take Σ∗t = (Ω
∗
t )
−1 for all t, since these matri-
ces satisfy the equivalent condition (10c). Otherwise, let t˜
be the first time index such that Rt˜(Ω∗t˜ ,Ω∗t˜+1) is not zero.
For t ≤ t˜, we take Σ∗t = (Ω∗t )−1 and so in particular we
have Rt˜((Σ∗t˜ )−1, Ω˜t˜+1)  0 and not zero. Consider the
matrix Ω˜t˜+1 = Ω
∗
t˜+1
+ Rt˜(Ω∗t˜ ,Ω∗t˜+1), which then satisfies
Rt˜(Ω∗t˜ , Ω˜t˜+1) = 0 by definition. We set Σ∗t+1 = Ω˜−1t+1.
Now note that we again have Rt˜+1((Σ∗t˜+1)−1, Ω˜t˜+2) 
0, by verifying that (17d) is satisfied at t + 1, using the fact
that (Σ∗
t˜+1
)−1 = Ω˜t˜+1  Ω∗t˜+1. From here we can proceed
by immediate induction, assuming that Σ∗0, . . . , Σ
∗
t are set and
taking
Σ∗t+1 = (Ω˜t+1)
−1 := (Ω∗t+1 +Rt((Σ∗t )−1,Ω∗t+1))−1, (18)
which reduces to (Ω∗t+1)
−1 ifRt((Σ∗t )−1,Ω∗t+1) = 0.
The procedure above provides a solution Π∗, {Σ∗t }Tt=0
satisfying the constraints of the original program (10a)-(10d).
Because by construction we have (Σ∗t )
−1  Ω∗t and the
matrices (Σ∗t )
−1 also satisfy (17d), taking Ωt = (Σ∗t )
−1 in
(17a)-(17e) gives a cost V for (17a) that is at most the cost V∗
corresponding to Ω∗t , hence equal to V∗ by optimality of Ω∗t .
But this cost V is equal to 1T+1
∑T
t=0 Tr(LtΣ
∗
tL
T
t ) of (10a).
Hence, we have shown that (10a)-(10d) and (17a)-(17e) have
the same value, and constructed an optimal solution Π∗,
{Σ∗t }Tt=0 to (10a)-(10d) achieving this value.
4.3. Stationary problem
In the stationary case (T → ∞), with the model (4) now as-
sumed time-invariant, a time-invariant filter and a matrix D
can be constructed by solving the following SDP with vari-
ables Π  0, X  0, Ω  0
min
X,Ω,Π
Tr(X) s.t. (19a)[
X L
LT Ω
]
 0, (19b)[
CTΠC − Ω + Ξ ΞA
ATΞ Ω +ATΞA
]
 0, (19c)[
Ipi/α
2
i + V
−1
i E
T
i
Ei V − VΠV
]
 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. (19d)
4.4. Application Example
Consider a scenario where the Public Health Services have
to publish the number Et of people in a population ex-
posed/infected by a disease, using data collected from n = 10
hospital emergency departments, to perform epidemic out-
break detection. The states xi,t =
[
Ei,t Ii,t
]T
evolve as
a second-order system [26] with Ai =
[−0.4 0.5
0.6 0.75
]
. Let
Ci,t = I2, Wi,t = W = 0.15
[
1 0.2
0.2 2
]
, and Vi = 0.4I2.
Fix ρl = 5, l = 1, 2 and ρj = 10, j = 3, .., 10. The aim is
to publish an estimate of zt =
∑n
i=1
([
1 0
]× xi,t). We
design the architecture of Fig.1.b by solving (19a)-(19d), set-
ting the privacy parameters to δ = 0.01 and  = ln(3). This
leads to an steady-state MSE of 4.91. On the other hand, the
steady-state MSE for the input perturbation architecture is
7.06.
5. CONCLUSION
This paper considers the Kalman filtering problem under a
differential privacy constraint. An architecture combining
the differentially private Gaussian mechanism with a signal
shaping matrix and a time-varying Kalman filter for output
reconstruction is proposed, and it is shown that optimizing the
parameters of this architecture can be done via semi-definite
programming. Examples illustrate the achievable perfor-
mance gains compared to the input perturbation mechanism.
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